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The Supreme Court [in Bowers v. Hardwick] has ruled that homosexual
activity is not a fundamental right protected by substantive due process
.... [f there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, it would be incon-
gruous to expand the reach of equal protection to find a fundamental right
of homosexual conduct under the equal protection component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
-High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial
Security Clearance Office'
Bowers was not correct when it was decided, is not correct today, and is
hereby overruled. This case... involve[s] two adults who, with full and
mutual consent, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifes-
tyle. Petitioners' right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the
full right to engage in private conduct without government intervention.
-Lawrence v. Texas
2
THE UNITED STATES Supreme Court case Lawrence v. Texas argua-
bly has made consensual, private sexual activity between gays a funda-
mental privacy right. As a result, two fifteen-year-old Ninth Circuit
cases that epitomize the Circuit's equal protection jurisprudence must
be reevaluated. This Article's purpose is twofold: (1) to criticize the
Ninth Circuit's existing Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence as it
relates to state action that targets gays, and (2) to explain how the
* B.A., University of Wisconsin, Madison (2001); J.D., U.C.L.A. School of Law
(2004), Order of the Coif The author practices litigation with Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &
McCloy; however, the views expressed herein are not meant to represent the Firm's
opinions or beliefs. The author wishes to thank Dylan Ruga and Milbank attorney Rick
Baker for their helpful comments, and Sarah Goldman, who mercifully continues to love a
frantic lawyer.
1. 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
194-96 (1986)).
2. 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003).
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Ninth Circuit must reevaluate such jurisprudence in response to
Lawrence.3
Under current law, state action that targets gays need only meet
rational basis scrutiny. That is, a law targeting gays must be rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. 4 The federal judiciary's decision
to apply such a low level of scrutiny, however, generally reflects long-
standing prejudices and stereotypes. 5 Furthermore, Lawrence may have
created a fundamental right to sodomy and signaled that the federal
judiciary should afford a more searching form of review to laws that
discriminate against gays. Consequentially, the Ninth Circuit should
seize the opportunity to reevaluate its equal protection jurisprudence
and afford strict scrutiny status to laws that target gays.
Two cases, Watkins v. United States Army and High Tech Gays v.
Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office,7 exemplify the Ninth Circuit's
analysis of government action that targets gays. Watkins shows that, not
withstanding the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick,8 the Ninth Circuit has been willing to classify gays as a sus-
pect class. 9 High Tech Gays, however, later held that government action
concerning gays need only meet rational basis review10 and demon-
strates how Bowers has affected (and continues to affect) the Ninth
Circuit's equal protection jurisprudence.
3. This Article does not address whether discrimination against gays should be
treated as sex-based discrimination, which receives a level of intermediate scrutiny under
the Federal Constitution. It should be noted, however, that the California Constitution
affords strict scrutiny under its equal protection clause to gender discriminatory laws. CAL.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 7. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, the circuit in which California sits, should
reflect progressive attitudes towards discriminatory state action.
4. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996).
5. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that discrimination against gays is "likely
... to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than ... rationality"); Baker v. Vermont, 744
A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the equal protection analysis of a state law forbid-
ding gay couples to marry "does not turn on the religious or moral debate over intimate
same-sex relationships, but rather on the statutory and constitutional basis for the exclu-
sion of same-sex couples from the secular benefits and protections offered married
couples"); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2d ed.
2002).
6. 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988). But see Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
7. 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
8. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding there is no fundamental right to engage in private
consensual sodomy).
9. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1343.
10. 895 F.2d at 571.
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In analyzing Lawrence, however, it becomes readily apparent that
private, consensual, gay sexual activity should be considered a funda-
mental right and that, consequently, gays should be treated as a sus-
pect class. 1 Indeed, in today's evolving world, applying anything but
strict scrutiny review to state action targeting gays likely reflects either
religious or social-psychological factors, neither of which are valid le-
gal reasons to deny someone equal protection under the Constitu-
tion. 12 This issue could not be riper for revisiting in the Ninth Circuit
because not only has it previously held that gays constitute a suspect
class, but also because it would afford the court an opportunity to
highlight the best aspects of a progressive and liberal approach to civil
rights jurisprudence. 13 Moreover, as discussed infra, the fact that gay
sodomy may be a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth
11. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
12. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 395 (1969). See also GRACE GANZ
BLuMBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 449-50 (4th ed. 2003) (analyzing Califor-
nia's gay-oriented domestic partnership laws and Vermont's gay-oriented civil union laws).
Blumberg concludes that "the distinction between a Vermont civil union and a lawful mar-
riage is merely symbolic. In law, marriage is simply the sum of its legal incidents. Of course,
from the perspective of religion or social psychology, there may be other dimensions to
marriage." Id. See also Philip Pullella, Pope Calls Gay Marriage Part of "Ideology of Evil",
RTEus, Feb. 22, 2005, available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=522276 (last
accessed Apr. 9, 2005). Pope John Paul II referring to pressure on the European Union to
legalize gay marriage, wrote that "[i] t is legitimate and necessary to ask oneself if this is not
perhaps part of a new ideology of evil, perhaps more insidious and hidden, which attempts
to pit human rights against the family and against man." Id.
13. See, e.g., Edward Lazarus, The Federal Appellate Decision Delaying the Recall: Bush v.
Gore's Tragedy Repeats Itself as California's Farce, FINDLAW's LEGAL COMMENT., Sept. 18, 2003,
at *1, at http://www.findlaw.com (to access this article: (1) click "Search FindLaw" tab; (2)
type title of this article as referenced; (3) click "Search") (declaring the Ninth Circuit to be
"the most liberal court of appeals in the country"). But see Timothy Wheeler, The Great Leap
Backward in the Ninth Circuit Court, CLAREMONT INST., Sept. 18, 2003, at *1-*2, at http://
www.claremont.org/projects/doctors/021215wheeler.html (last accessed Apr. 22, 2005).
Dr. Wheeler criticizes the Ninth Circuit as
preach [ing] a brand of in-your-face progressivism that outrages even Californi-
ans.... [Its] hubris is well known-it is reversed far more often than any of the
other 12 federal appellate courts. It comes as no surprise that the court's Judge
Stephen Reinhardt ... was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court 11 times in one
term.
Id. Not only does the Ninth Circuit usually hand down liberal decisions, it is also
the largest federal appeals court in the US, covering nine states (Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington), plus
Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. Its judges are responsible for about 55
million Americans and more than a third of the nation's land-far more than any
of the other 10 federal appellate regions.
Brad Knickerbocker, One 9th Circuit Appeals Court, Under God?, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR,
Aug. 8, 2002, at *1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0808/p02s01-usju.html
(last accessed Apr. 22, 2005).
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Amendment's Due Process Clause fulfills one of the Ninth Circuit's
requirements for gays to be deemed a suspect class under the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Part I of this Article explains the current status of gays in the con-
text of equal protection jurisprudence. Part II describes Watkins, a
Ninth Circuit case holding that laws targeting gays should receive
strict scrutiny, a holding that was subsequently withdrawn by the court
upon rehearing. Part II also discusses and criticizes High Tech Gays, the
next major Equal Protection Clause case heard by the Ninth Circuit
after Watkins, which held that government action that targets homo-
sexuals is subject to mere rational basis scrutiny. Part III discusses the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and explains why the
Ninth Circuit should rule that Lawrence renders High Tech Gays bad law
when it next hears an equal protection claim that involves a law that
targets gays as a class. Subsequently, Part IV proposes an alteration to
the existing test used to determine whether a group constitutes a sus-
pect or quasi-suspect class. Part V concludes by declaring that the
stage is set for the Ninth Circuit to maintain its progressive reputation
by declaring gays a suspect group for equal protection purposes.
I. Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Standard of Review
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution commands that "no State shall deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,
which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike."1 4 Under current law, government actors can-
not arbitrarily discriminate against homosexuals. 15 To demonstrate
that discrimination based on sexual orientation creates an Equal Pro-
tection Clause violation, a plaintiff must show, using a rational basis
test, that
the defendants: (1) treated him differently from others who were
similarly situated, (2) intentionally treated him differently because
of his membership in the class to which he belonged (i.e., homo-
sexuals), and (3) because homosexuals do not enjoy any height-
ened protection under the Constitution, that the
14. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 570 (9th Cir.
1990) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
15. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the court should apply the "active" rational basis scrutiny employed by the United States
Supreme Court in Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)); Dubbs v. Central Intelli-
gence Agency, 866 F.2d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1989); High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574-78.
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discriminatory intent was not rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.16
Moreover, differential treatment based solely on animus towards gays
cannot survive rational basis scrutiny. 17 If gays, however, were treated
as a suspect or quasi-suspect class, then the courts would be forced to
apply a higher level of scrutiny to laws that target gays. To be a "sus-
pect" or "quasi-suspect" class,
homosexuals must (1) have suffered a history of discrimination;
(2) exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics
that define them as a discrete group; and (3) show that they are a
minority or politically powerless, or alternatively show that the stat-
utory classification at issue burdens a fundamental right.18
If a class of people burdened are "despised or politically powerless
groups," such that discrimination is "likely to reflect antipathy against
those groups [then] the classifications are inherently suspect and
must be strictly scrutinized."19
The Ninth Circuit's application of rational basis scrutiny to laws
targeting gays has been largely caused by judges' unfortunate reliance
on the Bowers holding that gay sexual activity is not a fundamental
right. In 2003, however, Lawrence overruled Bowers. This decision
should render moot those Ninth Circuit cases that fail to apply strict
scrutiny to laws targeting gays because of their sexual orientation or
16. Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 950-51 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996)); see also Buttino v. F.B.I., 801 F. Supp. 298,
306 n.13 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("[T]he requirement that anti-gay discrimination be subjected
only to .'rational basis' review, rather than to either 'heightened' or 'strict' scrutiny, is the
object of considerable criticism.") In support of their argument, the Buttino court pointed
to the opinions of the following: the ChiefJudge of the Northern District of California, the
Honorable Thelton E. Henderson in High Tech Gays, the concurring opinions of The Hon-
orable William A. Norris and The Honorable William C. Canby, Jr. in Watkins, LAWRENCE
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-33, at 1616 (2d ed. 1988);J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DIsCONTENT 163-64 (1980); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 54-61 (Harvard Law
Rev., eds., 1989); and Note, An Agreement for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened
Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 797, 816-27 (1984). See
Buttino, 801 F. Supp at 306 n.13.
17. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 395; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (citing
Romer, 517 U.S. at 634); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the legis-
lature, its impartiality would be suspect.").
18. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573 (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03
(1987)). Also, even though Watkins involved the Federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment
equal protection guarantees, the court's "approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection
claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Four-
teenth Amendment." Id. at 571.
19. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 712 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(Norris, J., concurring).
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sexual conduct.20 While Lawrence does not afford gays strict scrutiny
protection under the federal Equal Protection Clause, it does possibly
establish one of the three elements-sodomy as a fundamental
right-that must be met in the Ninth Circuit to trigger strict judicial
scrutiny of government action that discriminates against gays. If the
Ninth Circuit adopted this analysis of Lawrence, it could be the first
circuit to provide gays with the strict scrutiny protection that they
need and deserve. In order to better understand why the Ninth Cir-
cuit is the ideal circuit to lead this charge towards equal rights for
gays, two major Ninth Circuit cases must be evaluated: Watkins and
High Tech Gays.
H. Ninth Circuit Jurisprudence
A. Watkins v. United States Army
In 1988, for the first time ever, a Ninth Circuit majority in Watkins
v. United States Army held that homosexuals constituted a suspect class
and that strict judicial scrutiny must apply to governmental discrimi-
nation against homosexuals.21 Watkins involved Army regulations that
severely discriminated against gays by mandating that gay soldiers be
discharged.22 Indeed, "the discrimination against homosexual orienta-
tion [by the United States Army] under [its] regulations [at issue was]
20. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
21. SeeWatkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1988), amend-
ing 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988) (appeal after remand).
22. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 713 n.5. The plaintiff, Watkins, had been discharged for
allegedly squeezing the knee of a male soldier, although the Army failed to prove that
Watkins so acted. Id. at 715. The Army regulation at issue at the time of Watkins, AR 635-
200, set forth:
15-2 Definitions ...
a. Homosexual means a person, regardless of sex, who engages in, desires to en-
gage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.
b. [omitted].
c. A homosexual act means bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively per-
mitted, between soldiers of the same sex for sexual satisfaction.
15-3 Criteria
The basis for separation may include preservice, prior service, or current service
conduct or statements. A soldier will be separated per this chapter if one or more
of the following approved findings is made:
a. The soldier has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to
engage in a homosexual act unless there are further approved findings that-
(1) Such conduct is a departure from the soldier's usual and customary behav-
ior; and
(2) Such conduct is unlikely to recur because it is shown, for example, that the
act occurred because of immaturity, intoxication, coercion, or a desire to
avoid military service; and
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about as complete as one could imagine." 23 Upon rehearing en banc,
however, the Watkins majority expressly, and probably unnecessarily,
withdrew that prior holding.24 Rather than reach the equal protection
issue on the merits, that court simply held that the federal govern-
ment was equitably estopped from engaging in sexual orientation-
based discrimination. 25
. Judge Norris's concurrence in the en banc rehearing for Watkins,
however, addressed the equal protection issue.2 6 At the threshold,
Judge Norris indicated that Bowers only applied to the Due Process
Clause of the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, and
thus did not control the issue of whether gays constitute a suspect
class under the Equal Protection Clause. 27 He ultimately determined
that gays do indeed constitute a suspect class, and that laws targeting
gays should be subject to strict scrutiny.28 In making this determina-
tion, Judge Norris analyzed the factors courts typically use to deter-
mine whether gays should be classified as a suspect or quasi-suspect
class: historical discrimination, immutability of characteristics, and
lack of political power.2 9
1. Historical Discrimination
Judge Norris first determined that "homosexuals have historically
been subject to invidious discrimination, [and] laws which burden
(3) Such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or intimida-
tion by the soldier during a period of military service; and
(4) Under the particular circumstances of the case, the soldier's continued
presence in the Army is consistent with the interest of the Army in proper
discipline, good order, and morale; and
(5) The solider does not desire to engage in or intend to engage in homosex-
ual acts.
Id. at 713 n.5 (citing AR 635-200). The regulation also noted that all five of the above
findings must occur before a soldier can be discharged from the army. Id. This reflected
the "policy... to permit retention only of nonhomosexual soldiers." Id. Then, the regulation
also provides that a soldier can be discharged for saying that he or she is a homosexual
(absent evidence to the contrary) or for marrying, or attempting to marry, a "person
known to be of the same biological sex.., unless there are further findings that the soldier
is not a homosexual or bisexual." Id. Such discharged soldiers could not reenlist under AR
601-280. Id.
23. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 716 (Norris, J., concurring in judgment).
24. Id. at 711.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 724-28.
27. Id. at 716 (stating that "nothing in Hardwick suggests that the state may penalize
gays merely for their sexual orientation").
28. Id.
29. Id. at 728.
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homosexuals as a class should be subjected to heightened scrutiny
under the equal protection clause."3 0 Even the government conceded
that "it is indisputable that 'homosexuals have historically been the
object of pernicious and sustained hostility."' 31
2. Immutable Characteristic
Judge Norris next determined that homosexuality was an immu-
table characteristic, even assuming arguendo that a person could re-
verse his or her sexual preference through "difficult and traumatic"
treatment, such as "extensive therapy, neurosurgery or shock treat-
ment."32 More importantly, he concluded "that allowing the govern-
ment to penalize the failure to change [one's sexual preference,] such
a central aspect of individual and group identity[,] would be abhor-
rent to the values animating the constitutional ideal of equal protec-
tion of the laws." 33
3. Politically Powerless
Lastly, Judge Norris explained why homosexuals cannot, as a
group, protect their rights by appealing to the government's political
branches.3 4 He argued that not only have gays historically "been un-
derrepresented in and victimized by political bodies," but also gays are
"handicapped by structural barriers that operate to make effective po-
litical participation unlikely if not impossible."35 Such barriers can be
social, economic, or political pressure to conceal one's sexual prefer-
ence, which in turn would lead to a gay person's failure to protest
against discriminatory government action. 36 Indeed, Judge Norris
contended, by outing one's self as gay, a person exposes himself or
herself to the discrimination that they seek to eliminate.3 7 Addition-
30. Id. at 719.
31. Id. at 724 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 726; see generally Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protec-
tion for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. RaV. 915, 937 (1989); Note, The Consti-
tutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. RaV.
1285, 1303 (1985) (arguing that the ability to change a trait is not as important as whether
the trait is a "determinative feature of personality").
33. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 727.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the denial of certiorari by explaining that
"[b] ecause of the immediate and severe opprobrium often manifested against homosexu-
als once so identified publicly, members of this group are particularly powerless to pursue
their rights openly in the political arena").
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ally, general animus or outright hatred towards gays can render gay
political participation ineffective. 38 Such animus was reflected in the
Army's resistance to allowing gays to participate. The Army argued
that its regulations were 'Justified by the need to maintain the public
acceptability of military service, because toleration of homosexual
conduct... might be understood as tacit approval and the existence
of homosexual units might well be a source of ridicule and
notoriety."39
Judge Norris consequently determined that gays comprised a sus-
pect class and that strict scrutiny should be used to review sexual ori-
entation-based discrimination. 40 The fact that the majority did not
address such an important issue, knowing full well that the concur-
rence delved so deeply and convincingly into the equal protection
claim, suggests that the majority did not necessarily mean to foreclose
the possibility that homosexuals could be considered a suspect class in
a later case.
B. High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office
Subsequent Ninth Circuit cases brushed aside Judge Norris's ra-
tionale and applied rational basis scrutiny to equal protection claims
in the context of discrimination against homosexuals. 41 In High Tech
38. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 727; see also INFOPLEASE, THE AMERICAN GAY RIGHTS MOVE-
MENT: A TIMELINE, at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0761909.html (last accessed Apr.
22, 2005) (indicating that gays could not have held too much political sway until the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century because gays did not enjoy the right to engage in sodomy
until 1962, when Illinois decriminalized such acts, and discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation was not outlawed by a state until Wisconsin did so in 1982, just a little more than
twenty years ago).
39. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 727 (quotations and citations omitted).
40. Id. at 728. It should be noted that Judge Norris launches into a discussion of the
conduct versus orientation dichotomy. As he states, "[T]he class of persons involved in
Hardwick-those who engage in homosexual sodomy-is not congruous with the class of
persons targeted by the Army's regulations-those with a homosexual orientation. Hard-
wick was a 'conduct' case; Watkins' is an 'orientation' case." Id. at 716-17. Judge Norris
then added that Professor Cass Sunstein agrees with this analysis. Id. at 717 n.10 (quoting
Cass Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due
Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1162 n.9 (1988)). The conduct/orien-
tation paradigm highlights the high degree of connectivity between the Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause as they apply to laws affecting homosexuals. Such a
distinction seems to be a creature of necessity, because courts desiring to afford a stricter
form of scrutiny to gay-based discrimination needed something "to hang their hat on" in
the face of Bowers. Such a distinction is no longer necessary given that Lawrence overruled
Bowers. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
41. See, e.g., Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F. 3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir.
2003); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1997); Philips v.
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Gays, a class action filed against the Defense Industrial Security Clear-
ance Office ("DISCO") challenged "the mandatory investigation of all
homosexual applicants seeking a Secret or Top Secret clearance" with
the Department of Defense. 42 In particular, the government had to
evaluate an application to determine whether that applicant is "eligi-
ble to access classified information or assignment to sensitive du-
ties . . . based on all available information, the person's loyalty,
reliability, and trustworthiness." 43 Such characteristics must be "such
that entrusting the person with classified information or assigning the
person to sensitive duties is clearly consistent with the interests of na-
tional security."44 The plaintiffs asserted that being gay made an appli-
cant unreliable and untrustworthy under DISCO's regulation, such
that gays could not receive security clearance. 45 The Ninth Circuit re-
viewed the case to determine whether DISCO's policy violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and utilized the
traditional three-prong test to determine whether gays constituted a
suspect class: historical discrimination, immutable characteristics, and
whether gays were politically powerless or a minority. Additionally,
and quite importantly, the court examined an additional, alternative
Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1997); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance
Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1990).
42. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 565.
43. Id. at 566 (citing 32 C.F.R. § 154.6(b) (1987)).
44. Id. (citing 32 C.F.R. § 154.6(b)).
45. Id. at 566-67 n.4 (citing 32 C.F.R. § 154.7). Section 154.7 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, Title 32, provides:
The criteria for determining eligibility for a clearance under the security standard
shall include, but not be limited to the following: ... (h) Criminal or dishonest
conduct... [and] (q) Acts of sexual misconduct or perversion indicative of moral
turpitude, poor judgment, or lack of regard for the laws of society.
32 C.F.R. § 154.7 § (h), (q). Furthermore, in investigating applicants,
[t]he DIS Manual for Personnel Security Investigations (DIS 20-1-M) estab-
lishe [d] operational and investigative policy and procedural guidance for con-
ducting personnel security investigations. According to the DIS 20-1-M, the DIS
will not ordinarily "investigate allegations of heterosexual conduct between con-
senting adults." . . . Other sexual conduct including homosexuality, bestiality, fetish-
ism, exhibitionism, sadism, masochism, transvestism, necrophilia, nymphomania
or satyriasis, pedophilia and voyeurism is considered a "relevant consideration in cir-
cumstances in which deviant conduct indicates a personality disorder or could result in
exposing the individual to direct or indirect blackmail or coercion .... Participation in
deviant sexual activities may tend to cast doubt on the individual's morality, emo-
tional or mental stability and may raise questions as to his or her susceptibility to
coercion or blackmail."
Id. at 568 (emphasis added) (quoting DEP'T OF DEF., DIS MANUAL FOR PERSONNEL SECURUTY
INVESTIGATIONS 20-1-M, 4-10, at 4 (1985)).
[Vol. 39
EQUAL PROTECTION FOR GAYS AFTER LAWRENCE
factor that relates to the third prong: state infringement upon a fun-
damental right.
1. Historical Discrimination
The High Tech Gays court agreed that homosexuals have suffered
a history of discrimination. 46 The court, however, did not believe that
gays constituted a suspect class because they did not exhibit immuta-
ble traits, they were not politically powerless, and laws targeting homo-
sexuals did not infringe upon a fundamental right.
47
2. Immutable Characteristic
The court stated, without convincing support, that
"[h]omosexuality is not an immutable characteristic; it is behavioral
and hence is fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender,
or alienage, which define already existing suspect and quasi-suspect
classes."48 This reasoning suffers from fundamental flaws. First, rea-
sonable minds could differ as to whether homosexuality is a behav-
ioral characteristic or an immutable characteristic; certainly one could
argue that a person does not choose to be gay, but rather is born
gay.49 Second, the court ignored the other characteristics that could
46. Id. at 573. It bears noting that discrimination against gays is not unique to
America. Indeed, gays in other countries have suffered from similar historical discrimina-
tion. For example, Canada (provinces of which recently legalized gay marriage) used to
treat gays
[a]s mentally ill and have... subjected [them] to conversion "therapies," includ-
ing electroshock treatment .... [It also employed] immigration law[s] which pro-
hibited [gays'] entry into [Canada] and subjected those who were immigrants to
the threat of deportation (1952-1977), as well as a penal law which criminalized
certain forms of gay male sexual expression and rendered gay men vulnerable to
indefinite incarceration as "dangerous sexual offenders" (1892-1969) .... [I]n
the 1960's ... approximately 150 gay federal civil servants resigned or were dis-
missed from their employment without just cause. Furthermore, lesbians and gay
men were not permitted, until recently, to participate openly in the Armed
Forces.
EGALE CANADA, HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST GAYS AND LESBIANS, at http://www.
egale.ca/index.asp?lang=&menu=l&item= 4 9 (last accessed Apr. 22 , 2005).
47. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573.
48. Id.
49. See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 377 (9th
Cir. 1990) (denying rehearing en banc) (CanbyJ., dissenting). While denying a rehearing,
Judge Canby indicated that "[tihe Supreme Court has more than once recited the charac-
teristics of a suspect class without mentioning immutability." Id. (citing City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 313 (1976); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). Moreover,
aliens constitute a suspect category; clearly, being an "alien" is not an immutable condi-
tion. Id. (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971)). Indeed,
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be exhibited to satisfy the second prong: "obvious" and "distinguish-
ing" characteristics. While one cannot always tell when an individual is
gay or straight, as opposed to whether an individual is, for example,
African-American, the signifiers of homosexuality can be obvious: pas-
sionately kissing a member of one's own sex, for example, would in
many circumstances be a characteristic of homosexuality. Although
such public displays of affection can be stifled, unlike race or gender,
the stifling of one's sexuality can be considered tantamount to the
suppression of one's very essence; therefore, simply because one can
hide that he or she is gay does not necessarily render homosexuality a
mutable characteristic. 50 Addressing this point, the court noted that
"[t] he behavior or conduct of such already recognized classes is irrele-
vant to their identification."5 1 Thus, even though engaging in certain
sexual conduct may reveal an individual as gay, it is that very conduct
[t]he real question is whether discrimination on the basis of the class's distin-
guishing characteristic amounts to an unfair branding or resort to prejudice, not
necessarily whether the characteristic is immutable.... There is every reason to
regard homosexuality as an immutable characteristic for equal protection pur-
poses. It is not enough to say that the category is "behavioral." One can make
"behavioral" classes out of persons who go to church on Saturday, persons who
speak Spanish, or persons who walk with crutches. The question is, what causes
the behavior? Does it arise from the kind of characteristic that belongs peculiarly
to a group that the equal protection clause should specially protect? Homosexu-
als are physically attracted to members of their own sex. That is the source of the
behavior that we notice about them. Did they choose to be attracted by members
of their own sex, rather than by members of the opposite sex? The answer, by the
overwhelming weight of respectable authority, is "no." Sexual identity is estab-
lished at a very early age; it is not a matter of conscious or controllable choice.
Can homosexuals change their orientation? Again, from everything we now know,
the answer is "no." At least they cannot change it without immense difficulty. As
Judge Norris has asked, what would it take to get any one of us to change his or
her sexual orientation?
Id. at 377 (citing Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 34 (D.C. 1987)); see
also Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, J.,
concurring in judgment); A. BELL, M. WEINBERY, & F. HAMMERSMITH, SEXUAL PREFERENCE-
ITS DEVELOPMENT IN MEN AND WOMEN 166-67, 190, 211, 222 (1981); LAWRENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 944-45, n.17 (1978).
50. See discussion supra note 49.
51. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573-74. But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583
(2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated that
[w]hile it is true that [the law at issue] applies only to conduct, the conduct
targeted by this law is conduct that is closely correlated with being homosexual.
Under such circumstances, Texas' sodomy law is targeted at more than conduct.
It is instead directed towards gay persons as a class. "After all, there can hardly be
more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class
criminal."
Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (emphasis
added).
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that defines the person as gay; consequently, contrary to the majority's
holding, homosexuals meet this second prong.
3. Target of Government Action Is Politically Powerless, a
Minority, or a Fundamental Right Is Implicated
The court also noted that gays are "not without political power;
they have the ability to and do 'attract the attention of the lawmakers,'
as evidenced by [anti-discrimination] legislation." 52 Also, as opposed
to the Watkins majority, who failed to address whether or not the gov-
ernmental action implicated a fundamental right, the High Tech Gays
judges relied on Bowers and stated that "homosexual activity is not a
fundamental right.153 The court thus concluded that gays do not sat-
isfy the third prong's requirement that they "show that they are a mi-
nority or politically powerless, or alternatively show that the statutory
classification at issue burdens a fundamental right."5 4
While the court cited several examples of laws targeting anti-gay
discrimination, 55 it failed to link such legislation to efforts of gays or
activist groups. It also failed to account for the fact that similar legisla-
tion was not enacted in several states. 56 Moreover, it completely ig-
nored the sensible explanation of gays' lack of political power
espoused in Watkins.57 This unsatisfactory analysis simply ignores the
fact that the enactment of anti-gay discrimination statutes does not
necessarily mean that the group targeted by discrimination holds po-
litical sway. One should doubt, for example, that a court would hold
that southern African-Americans in the 1960s held political power be-
cause anti-discrimination laws were passed.58 Indeed, while gays hold a
52. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574 (quoting Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 445).
53. Id. at 571. Note that whether private, consensual gay sexual activity constitutes a
fundamental right was not listed as a determinative criteria in Watkins.
54. Id. at 573.
55. Id. at 574 n.10.
56. In 1990, when High Tech Gays was decided, less than 11.9 million Americans lived
in a state with a law banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. SEAN CA-
HILL, WHAT'S AT STAKE FOR THE GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY IN
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2, available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/
atstake2000.pdf (last accessed Jan. 19, 2005). Moreover, though the number of people
protected by such statutes increased to approximately sixty-five million as of 2000, only "28
states [had] enacted either civil rights laws or hate crimes laws that address discrimination
and harassment based upon sexual orientation and/or gender identity." Id. at 9.
57. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
58. For example, while over "13,000 people have served in the national legislature,
including the Continental Congress, the Senate, and the House of Representatives," as of
2002 only 107 African-Americans have served in the United States Congress. See U.S. SEN-
ATE, MINORITIES IN THE SENATE, at http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/com-
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noticeable degree of political influence in states like California or
New York, gays in other states hold comparatively less political power.
Additionally, the court ignored the fact that gays could show that
they are politically powerless or a minority. 59 According to some statis-
tics, approximately one out of ten people is gay.60 Even if this overesti-
mates the gay population in America, the relatively small number of
gays in America still qualifies gays as a minority group. In comparison,
for example, the minority set of African-Americans constitute 12.9
percent of the United States population. 6 1
Despite the holding of High Tech Gays, the application of rational
basis scrutiny has been strongly and sensibly criticized in the Ninth
Circuit. For example, although the High Tech Gays court denied re-
hearing en banc, Judge Canby's dissent, joined by Judge Norris,
strongly disapproved of the court's refusal to apply heightened scru-
tiny to a government regulation that targeted homosexuals:
We have made a grave error in failing to rehear this case en banc.
A panel of this court has held that our government may discrimi-
nate against homosexuals whenever it is able to put forth a rational
basis for doing so. That decision is wrong, and it will have tragic
results. The case should have gone en banc because of its sheer
importance. It also should have gone en banc because the panel's
mon/briefing/minoritysenators.htm (last accessed Apr. 22, 2005); CONG. BLACK CAUCUS
FOUND., INC., at http://cbcfinc.org/History.html (last accessed Jan. 19, 2005). As another
example, the Civil Rights Act of 1960 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution afforded federal civil rights to African-Americans, and yet access to the southern
state courts to enforce such rights was so paltry that the government had to specially enact
a statute authorizing citizens to bring such enforcement actions in federal court. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Moreover, that Congress did not enact section 1983 until 1979 fur-
ther evidences African-Americans' lack of political power during this era, despite the fact
that laws were being passed to protect their rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).
59. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573-74.
60. See, e.g., FAMILY RESEARCH INST., A SPECIAL REPORT, THE NUMBERS GAME: WHAT
PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION IS GAY? (1993), at www.familyresearchinst.org/FRI-AIM_
Talk.html (last accessed Apr. 22, 2005) (criticizing the widely-used figure of ten percent as
representing the gay population of the world, and indicating that the percentage of gay
people in the world is actually quite lower). Even if the gay/straight ratio is less than nine
to one, this simply supports the assertion that gays constitute a minority in this country.
61. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RACE ALONE OR IN COMBINATION: 2000, at http://fact
finder.census.gov/servlet/QTrable?geo-id=01000US&qr-name=DEC_2000 -SF1.U_QTP5
&dsname=DEC_2000_SF1U (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005). State action targeting African-
Americans, or any racial group for that matter, triggers strict scrutiny under the Constitu-
tion's Equal Protection Clause. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989).
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opinion skews equal protection analysis as ordained by the Su-
preme Court.62
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit's Equal Protection Clause juris-
prudence continues in the manner suggested by High Tech Gays to this
very day. In 2003, however, Lawrence v. Texas changed the landscape of
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. That case suggests, as dis-
cussed below, that a circuit court could hold that adults enjoy a funda-
mental right to engage in private, consensual sex with a member of
one's own gender. If this is the case, then the Ninth Circuit now has
another good reason to revisit its faulted equal protection jurispru-
dence as it relates to laws targeting gays: the potential deeming of
sodomy as a fundamental right.
HI. Lawrence v. Texas Renders the Reasoning of High Tech
Gays Obsolete, Making the Equal Protection Clause
Jurisprudence Ripe for Revisiting
In addition to arguing that homosexuals constitute a suspect
class, it- can also be argued that the right to engage in private, consen-
sual sexual activity, including homosexual activity, may be a funda-
mental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment under
Lawrence.63 In Lawrence, John Geddes Lawrence was arrested after the
62. High Tech Gays, 909 F.2d at 376 (Canby, J. dissenting). Judge Norris joined Judge
Canby's eloquent dissent. It is worth noting thatJudges Norris and Canby both wrote con-
currences in Watkins that decried the Circuit's failure to accord gays strict scrutiny
protection.
63. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); United States v. Extreme Assocs., 352
F. Supp. 2d 578, 591 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (indicating that Lawrence might have created some
form of fundamental right to sexual privacy, and using Lawrence as a basis for striking down
an obscenity prosecution). But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the court did not apply strict scrutiny, but rather "an unheard-of
form of rational-basis review that will have far-reaching implications beyond this case[,]"
and that while expressly overruling Bowers' outcome, the Court is not willing to "an-
nounce . . . a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy") (citing Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986)); Lofton v. Florida Dep't of Children & Families, 358
F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004). The Eleventh Circuit in Lofton held that gay petitioners
wishing to adopt a child that they had raised are distinguishable from gay adults who
wished to engage in private, sexual conduct partially because, unlike the right at issue in
Lawrence, adoption is a state-enacted statutory right invoking significant concerns that af-
fect both the child and the general public. Id. at 809. The Lofton court also held that a law
restricting gays from adopting children passed rational basis scrutiny, despite the fact that
Florida is the only state in the nation with such a law. Id. at 826. Furthermore, the Lofton
court was "particularly hesitant to infer a new fundamental liberty interest from [Law-
rence's] opinion whose language and reasoning are inconsistent with standard fundamen-
tal-rights analysis." Id. at 816. This easily distinguishable case indicates the vague nature of
the language used by the Lawrence Court, and indicates that a court could, indeed, just as
readily interpret Lawrence as providing a fundamental right to engage in gay sodomy.
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police witnessed both him and Tyron Garner engaging in a sexual act
in the privacy of Lawrence's apartment.64 They were arrested for and
convicted of violating a Texas statute prohibiting sodomy.65 Lawrence
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that the Texas
law violated both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.66 To truly understand how the
Lawrence opinion impacts equal protection jurisprudence, one must
have a firm understanding of the Due Process Clause and why Law-
rence all but explicitly deemed private, consensual, sodomy a funda-
mental right.
A. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause Protections
The Due Process Clause prevents all three government branches
from deliberately endorsing arbitrary and unreasonable legislation
and intentionally depriving citizens of their rights to life, liberty, and
property.67 Importantly, the Due Process Clause's "constitutional pur-
pose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a
legitimate claim of entitlement."68 As a result, it only protects constitu-
tional or statutory rights. 6 9 Though courts typically apply rational basis
scrutiny when a government actor infringes upon an identified liberty
or property interest, any government law or action that unduly
abridges a plaintiffs fundamental rights will be met with strict
scrutiny.70
A plaintiff can bring a substantive due process claim under two
theories. First, a plaintiff must "demonstrate a deprivation of an iden-
tified liberty or property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. . . . [S]econd, a plaintiff is not required to prove the
deprivation of a specific liberty or property interest, but, rather, he
64. 539 U.S. at 562-63.
65. Id. at 563 (citing TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003)). Section
21.06(a) provided that "[a] person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual
intercourse with another individual of the same sex." Id. Texas law also defined "deviate
sexual intercourse" as "(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and
the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of
another person with an object." Id. (citing TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01 (1)).
66. Id. at 564.
67. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1986) (holding that mere neg-
ligence on behalf of a State actor, as opposed to intentional acts, does not give rise to a due
process claim).
68. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983).
69. Townsend v. Cramblett, No. 89-3353, 1989 WL 153979, at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 21,
1989) (citing Olim, 461 U.S. at 249).
70. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
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must prove that the state's conduct 'shocks the conscience."' 71 "Lib-
erty" includes "the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge ...
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized... as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness in free men." 72 Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court broadly defines the meaning of "liberty."
73
Additionally, the Court has identified several fundamental rights
that are within the Due Process Clause's protection. Relevant rights
include freedom of speech and assembly,74 freedom of association
with others,75 the right of privacy (itself part of the Due Process
Clause's "liberty" component, which also includes the right to repro-
duction and marriage), 76 and the right to direct the education and
upbringing of one's children. 77 The Court has determined that any
state action that infringes upon any of these fundamental rights will
be met with strict scrutiny.
B. From Bowers to Lawrence. Expanding the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privacy Right to Gays, and Deregulating
"the Sacred Precincts of Marital Bedrooms"
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court held in Bowers that the
Constitution does not provide "a fundamental right to homosexuals to
engage in acts of consensual sodomy. ' 78 In that case, defendant Hard-
wick was arrested for engaging in homosexual activity in his bedroom,
in violation of a Georgia sodomy law.79 Though Hardwick challenged
the law as violating the liberty and privacy component of the Four-
71. Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 531 (1st Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted); see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
72. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
73. Id.
74. See Near, 283 U.S. at 707.
75. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
76. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
77. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400.
78. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
79. Id. at 187-88 n.1. The statute at issue provided:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprison-
ment for not less than one nor more than 20 years ....
Id. Although the law applied to both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy, the Court's
holding was limited to the denial of a right to engage in gay sodomy. Id. at 190. This was
probably incorrect, as the issue should have been about "government regulation of adults
in their bedrooms, not about the right to engage in homosexual activity." CHEMERINSKY,
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teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, Justice White, writing for
the majority, held that homosexual activity did not pertain to matters
of family and reproduction, matters with which the right of privacy
was typically associated.8 0
Bowers was hotly disputed, and some scholars claimed that the
1996 case of Romer v. Evans implicitly overruled Bowers's holding that
the right to engage in gay sex was not a liberty interest.8 1 The Lawrence
Court, however, explicitly overruled Bowers and held that such a right
is part of an individual's "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause,
although the Court did not expressly state that such a right is "funda-
mental."8 2 Nevertheless, if gay sexual activity is "private conduct" that
one has the "full right" to engage in, and it is protected as a liberty
interest, it stands to reason that the Ninth Circuit could hold that the
right to engage in such activity is fundamental.83
supra note 5, at 817 (citing LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 1428 (2d
ed. 1988)). As Tribe stated,
[I]n asking whether an alleged right forms part of a traditional liberty, it is crucial
to define the liberty at a high enough level of generality to permit unconven-
tional variants to claim protection along with mainstream versions of protected
conduct. The proper question . . . is not whether oral sex as such has long en-
joyed a special place in the pantheon of constitutional rights, but whether private,
consensual, adult sexual acts partake of traditionally revered liberties of intimate
association and individual autonomy.
Id.
80. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91. But see id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun's dissent chastises the majority's decision to ignore the role of personal auton-
omy in prior due process cases, which centered on the "right to be let alone" in making
"choices about the most intimate aspects of their lives." Id. at 199-200. He states that the
Court, rather, should have paid attention "to the basic reasons why certain rights associated
with the family have been accorded shelter under the. .. Due Process Clause. We protect
those rights... because they form so central a part of an individual's life" and the "moral
fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole." Id. at 204. In
essence, Justice Blackmun asserted that the fundamental right to intimate association en-
compasses the choice to engage in gay sodomy.
81. See, e.g., JIM WINNER, BEDS WITH SHEETS BUT No CovERs: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
AND THE MILImTARv'S REGULATION OF ADULTERY, available at http://faculty.lls.edu/~man
heimk/ns/winner2.htm (last accessed Apr. 22, 2005) (citing Thomas C. Grey, Gay Rights
and the Courts: The Amendment 2 Controversy, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 373, 374 (1997)).
82. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
83. But see id. at 590 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("While the Court does not overrule
Bowers' holding that homosexual sodomy is not a 'fundamental right,' it is worth noting
that the 'societal reliance' upon that aspect of the decision has been substantial as well.").
Indeed, the Court found that the statute at issue did not advance any legitimate govern-
ment interest. Id. at 560. Importantly, however, given Lawrence's reasoning, it seems hard to
imagine a time when a government action targeting the relevant gay conduct ever could
pass rational basis scrutiny. Since it is such conduct that actually defines the class of people,
why debase the entire universe of gays by refusing to afford strict scrutiny protection to
their right to engage in sexual conduct?
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Because gay sexual conduct is arguably fundamental under Law-
rence, High Tech Gays was clearly wrongly decided. Continuing its tradi-
tion of progressive thought, the Ninth Circuit can without hesitation
reverse High Tech Gays when the opportunity arises, as Lawrence elimi-
nates the reasons set forth in High Tech Gays for denying strict scrutiny
analysis to state action that targets gays.
1. Why Private, Consensual, Sexual Activity Should Be a
Fundamental Right
One of the major reasons that the Ninth Circuit should recon-
sider its equal protection jurisprudence is the Lawrence Court's ex-
press overruling of Bowers. Moreover, the Lawrence majority held that
an adult's right to engage in private, consensual sexual activity is a
protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. 84 The Court seemed eager to overrule Bowers, as it
launched into an attack on Bowers's initial substantive statement of the
issue presented in that case-" 'whether the Federal Constitution con-
fers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sod-
omy'" 8 5-which "disclose[d] the Court's failure to appreciate the
extent of the liberty at stake."'8 6 As in Lawrence, the laws in Bowers were
statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sex-
ual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reach-
ing consequences, touching upon the most private human
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the
home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that,
whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within
the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as
criminals. This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts
by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship
or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an
institution the law protects. 8
7
So, while the Court did not expressly state that the activity at issue
constituted a "fundamental right," its language certainly seems to indi-
cate as such. Indeed, the holding appears to use the type of hedging
language that a court would use when attempting to gradually expand
civil rights, serving -as a primer for future federal court decisions. Also,
84. Id. at 567. Only Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, addressed the Equal Pro-
tection Clause argument. Id. at 579-85. There she found that the law did not pass rational
basis scrutiny. Id. at 585.
85. Id. at 566 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190).
86. Id. at 567.
87. Id. at 567.
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such language may have been necessary to receive key support from
certain Supreme Court justices.
Indeed, ours is a nation particularly concerned with protecting
privacy within the home; this concern is so great that it was embodied
by the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights. 88 Furthermore, the
Lawrence facts presented the traditional signposts that the Court looks
to when deciding whether a right is "fundamental." Fundamental
rights are those that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition,"89 and must be "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty,"90 so that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacri-
ficed."91 States over the past several years have repealed laws targeting
gay conduct, thus establishing a tradition of protecting gay rights. 9 2
When sodomy laws were traditionally enforced, they were not typically
in the context of private, consensual homosexual conduct.93 Moreo-
ver, "American laws targeting same-sex couples did not develop until
88. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
89. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Washington v. Gluck-
sberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). But see County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "history and tradition are the starting point
but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry"); CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 5, at 765-66 (stating that "[s]ome argue that ... the Court only should recog-
nize nontextual rights that concern ensuring adequate representation and the effective
operation of the political process," others argue that Lockean "natural law principles"
should dictate which rights are fundamental, and yet others "maintain that the Court
should recognize nontextual fundamental rights that are supported by a deeply embedded
moral consensus that exists in society" (citations omitted)).
90. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26
(1937)).
91. Id.
92. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570 (citing Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002);
Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250
(Tenn. App. 1996); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); 1993 NEV. REv.
STAT. 518 (repealing NEV. REV. STAT. §201.93)).
93. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569-70. The Lawrence Court stated that
19th-century sodomy prosecutions typically involved relations between men and
minor girls or minor boys, relations between adults involving force, relations be-
tween adults implicating disparity in status, or relations between men and ani-
mals. . . .The longstanding criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy upon
which the Bowers decision placed such reliance is as consistent with a general con-
demnation of nonprocreative sex as it is with an established tradition of prosecut-
ing acts because of their homosexual character.
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the last third of the 20th century."94 Thus, in placing heavy reliance
on the history of sodomy laws when holding that gay sodomy is not a
fundamental right,
the Court in Bowers was making the broader point that for centu-
ries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual con-
duct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious
beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect
for the traditional family .... These considerations do not answer
the question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority
may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole
society through operation of the criminal law. "Our obligation is to
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."
95
2. High Tech Gays and Its Progeny Should Be Overruled, and Strict
Scrutiny Should Be Applied to All State Action That
Targets Gays
After Lawrence, the Ninth Circuit should (1) hold that the right to
engage in private, consensual gay sex is fundamental, and (2) conse-
quently, hold that gays should be treated as a suspect class for equal
protection purposes. Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence states that
High Tech Gays relied on Bowers's "holding that homosexual activity is
not a fundamental right in rejecting-on the basis of the rational-basis
standard-an equal-protection challenge to the Defense Depart-
ment's" discriminatory practices. 96 Lawrence, however, expressly over-
ruled Bowers and indicates that infringement upon private, consensual
94. Id. at 570. It is worth noting that such sodomy laws generally were enacted shortly
before homosexuality was removed from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders in 1974. See MINH T. NGUYEN, CML RIGHTS-THE HISTORY OF GAY RIGHTS, at http://
www.enderminh.com/minh/civilrights.aspx (last accessed Apr. 22, 2005). This indicates
that the "right" to engage in gay sex may not have existed because of medical misconcep-
tions of homosexuality as a disease. Changing conceptions of homosexuality's causes in the
last half of the twentieth century may have had the following effects: (1) medical profes-
sionals realized that gays do not suffer from mental illness by virtue of being gay, and (2)
legislators, feeling it permissible to legislate homosexuality if it is not a mental illness,
passed anti-sodomy statutes.
95. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). But see id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the
majority's opinion means that morality legislation can no longer be legitimate, and thus
laws cannot punish such criminal acts as "fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, besti-
ality, and obscenity"). There can be no legitimate state interest in legislating people's activ-
ities in the bedroom simply because one finds such activities to be immoral. Other actions,
however, such as adult incest and bestiality, can rightly be legislated because of other legiti-
mate interests. These interests include the protection of the public's health from diseases
resulting from human-animal sexual contact, the protection of a child who may be born
deformed because its parents are siblings, or the protection of animals, who cannot con-
sent to sex with a human, from abuse.
96. Id. at 590 n.2.
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homosexual activity among mature individuals demands a degree of
scrutiny higher than mere rational basis analysis. 97 Necessarily, High
Tech Gays's lynchpin notion-that private, consensual homosexual ac-
tivity only receives rational basis protection-evaporates under Law-
rence. Thus, High Tech Gays's failure to apply heightened scrutiny must
necessarily come under fire in light of Lawrence.
The Ninth Circuit employs a three-pronged approach to deter-
mine whether a class should be labeled "suspect." The class must have
historically suffered from discrimination, the class must exhibit immu-
table characteristics, and either the class must be politically powerless
or the state action must infringe upon a fundamental right.98 Gays
have historically suffered from discrimination. 99 Further, gays exhibit
immutable characteristics.100 Finally, after Lawrence, the Ninth Circuit
has the chance to declare as fundamental the right to engage in gay
sexual activity (indeed, the activity that defines one as "gay"). As a
result, even assuming arguendo the debatable contention that gays
hold political power or do not constitute a minority, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's third prong would be satisfied.
IV. A Proposal for Altering the "Historical Discrimination"
Prong of the Test Used to Determine Whether a
Group Qualifies as a Suspect or Quasi-Suspect
Class
If this Article's argument is carried to its extreme, several other
"groups" of people would be considered suspect classes. Pedophiles,
for example, have suffered historical discrimination in the form of
laws banning sexual conduct with children, their desire to have sexual
contact with children is immutable, and they arguably lack political
power and constitute a minority of the population. Nevertheless, one
should hesitate to classify pedophiles as a suspect class, even if laws
targeting pedophilic activity likely satisfy strict scrutiny review because
of the clear and compelling government interest in protecting the
welfare of children.
Thus, this Article proposes an alteration of the "historical dis-
crimination" prong of the test used to determine whether a class is
97. Id. at 578.
98. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir.
1990).
99. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Nor-
ris, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 726.
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suspect or quasi-suspect. As it stands, any time a group has been the
target of discriminatory laws, it can be argued that the group suffered
from historical discrimination. However, altering this prong to ac-
count for unjustifiable historical discrimination could properly limit
the classes of people that could be considered suspect or quasi-sus-
pect. The court's analysis of unjustifiable historical discrimination
would mirror the court's "active" rational basis scrutiny.10 1 In other
words, if the historical discrimination against a group took the form of
morality legislation based solely on animus to the group, such as in
Romer, then the discrimination would be "unjustifiable" and this prong
would be met.10 2 If the historical discrimination is otherwise justified,
as in the case of laws targeting pedophiles for the protection of inno-
cent children, then the historical discrimination is justified and that
group cannot attain suspect class status.10 3
Conclusion
The next time a Ninth Circuit court hears a case challenging state
action as violating the Equal Protection Clause, it must shoulder the
responsibility of abandoning the rationale it employed in High Tech
Gays and strictly scrutinize such action, as it did in the original Wat-
kins. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit should embrace the concept of
"unjustifiable historical discrimination" when determining whether
gays constitute a suspect class. This would be both consistent with the
United States Supreme Court's active rational basis standard and nec-
101. See supra note 15.
102. While a conservative court might seek to use this test to find that discrimination
against gays is justifiable to protect the sanctity of marriage, this Article specifically suggests
that the liberal Ninth Circuit lead the charge in this field. So, the conservative court argu-
ment is inapplicable. In addition,. it can be argued that "protecting the sanctity of mar-
riage" is a proxy for animus. To posit that gay marriage would harm the sanctity of
marriage" implies that being gay is somehow wrong. Thus, animus exists "behind the
scenes." Moreover, the term "sanctity" replies religious concerns and the wall between
church and state should be enough to bar this from being a legitimate state end. Perhaps
simply "preventing divorce," or "encouraging good relations between spouses" is a legiti-
mate end for the government, but enforcing a religious norm should not be. Finally, if the
government really wanted to protect the "sanctity of marriage," it would bar all marriage
between straight couples, which right now ends in divorce half of the time.
103. On several occasions, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the gov-
ernment's compelling interest in protecting children from harm. See, e.g., Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). In particular, this interest is substantial
where the government seeks to prosecute those who sexually exploit children. See Osborne
v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-11 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982).
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essary to prevent the extension of suspect class status to undeserving
groups, such as pedophiles.
Jurisprudence that reflects this argument will help to cement
equal rights for all American citizens-gay and straight alike-and it
will prevent the government from tacitly approving the beliefs of
those who feel that gays do not deserve to enjoy the same rights as
everyone else. Otherwise, gays will remain firmly within the govern-
ment's crosshairs, subject to laws that improperly ignore the values of
freedom and autonomy upon which this country was built.
